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Early art and the evolution of grounded emotions  
Gianluca Consoli 
1. Aesthetic emotions 
One of the topics studied and discussed more in recent years, both in the cognitive sci-
ences and in aesthetics, is constituted by the emotions. In neurocognitive research there 
has been a real explosion of studies: each year hundreds of papers are published. Also in 
aesthetics a very broad debate has taken place, especially concerning aesthetic emo-
tions. These are emotions prompted and guided by fictional representations, such as the 
representations conveyed by literature. These kinds of emotions are grounded on de-
coupled beliefs (disconnected from the current state of affairs) and on other-centered 
goals (derived from the other’s condition). Beliefs and goals are both simulated off-line: 
they do not produce actual decisions and behaviors. 
Much of the debate has regarded the so-called “paradox of fiction”, characterized by 
this discordant triad. (a) I’m moved by fiction: I feel the emotion x (for instance, pity) for 
the fictional character y (for instance, Anna Karenina); (b) - I believe that - to feel an 
emotion for y requires that y really exists; (c) - I know that - what is portrayed in fiction 
is not actual and real: the fictional character y does not actually exist. So, are aesthetic 
emotions authentic, genuine, sincere, appropriate, consistent, true, and real? In this 
way, the approach based on the paradox of fiction not only questions the formative and 
cognitive value of aesthetic emotions, but it also makes problematic even the basic func-
tioning of them (Davies [2009]). 
This essays ties together cognitive sciences and aesthetics, providing a general thesis 
that completely overturns the approach based on the paradox of fiction. Very far from be-
ing a paradoxical and marginal phenomenon (a shallow imitation of daily emotions), aes-
thetic emotions represent in evolutionary terms an indispensable means that allowed the 
emergence of the ordinary emotions, especially of the so-called «secondary emotions». 
This proposal will be articulated on the basis of a theory of emotions inspired by grounded 
Gianluca Consoli, Early art and the evolution of grounded emotions 
pag. 148 
© Firenze University Press • Aisthesis • 1/2015 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
cognition (Barsalou [2010]) and it will be developed in an evolutionary perspective 
through the reference to the archaeological evidence regarding the first art. 
2. Grounded emotions 
In order to argue our thesis it is crucial to stress two essential features of emotions. 
First, they can be conceived as episodes of temporary synchronization of several build-
ing components: perceptual construals and symbolic beliefs; inferences and reasoning; 
somatic retroaction and physiological regulation; goals activation and motivation; con-
trol, planning, and action; cognitive awareness of activating stimuli and phenomenal 
consciousness of on-line subjective experience. Although emotional responses can be 
dissociated (each system reflects many sources of variance in addition to emotionally 
relevant ones, so there are limits to their possible covariance), the synchronization usu-
ally emerges as a global and unitary experience, a gestalt-like integration with new 
properties that the atomic components do not have (Scherer [2005]). 
The recent perspective of grounded cognition allow us to fully understand precisely 
this gestalt-like synthesis of multiple blocks. The reference point is the theory of the 
human conceptual systems, developed on the basis of recent experimental and theoret-
ical results (Barsalou [2012]). This theory assumes that concepts are not amodal symbols 
computed in a modular system separated from the brain’s modal systems for percep-
tion, action, introspection. On the contrary, concepts can be viewed as grounded repre-
sentations, that is, organized collections of the multimodal information that has been 
typically experienced and processed for concepts’ instances by multiple systems (per-
ception, action, interoception, affect, mentalizing, language, reasoning, and so on). Con-
cepts develop for aspects of experience that are relevant repeatedly across situations; 
the resulting profile of activity is established in memory, stored in distributed neural cir-
cuits, accessed in relevant situations. From this perspective, concepts are simulators: in-
tegrated patterns of multimodal simulation. When a concept is activated, there is a re-
enactment of perceptual, motor, affective, and introspective states previously acquired 
during experience with the world, body, and mind – in the absence of bottom-up stimu-
lation. Moreover, concepts are rarely represented in a vacuum, but are instead situated 
in meaningful background situations. These «situated conceptualizations» are extended 
networks of background concepts that represent elements of the entire situation. They 
typically include a setting, agents, objects, behaviors, events and internal states, each 
represented by relevant concepts. Furthermore, a great diversity exists in the specific 
situated conceptualizations that situate a concept on different occasions. 
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In fundamentally the same vein «emotion concepts» unify emotions as multicomponent 
processes (Wilson-Mendenhall et al. [2011]). As multimodal simulations, emotion con-
cepts support and control perception, categorization, inference, internal states, and ac-
tion. Again, they do not work in isolation, but are typically situated in background set-
tings, events, and introspections. Precisely, a specific emotion concept is related to a 
large set of situated conceptualizations. Therefore, across different occasions, each situ-
ated conceptualization can produce not only different emotions, but also different forms 
of the same emotion, in terms of categorizations, subjective experience, bodily state, 
and potential actions. For instance, fear can be felt quite differently. On the basis of the 
relevant situated conceptualizations, it can be a fast reaction of flight in response to a 
sudden and threatening stimulus, but it can also be a reflexive, free-floating feeling 
without any direct cause. 
Secondly, grounded cognition allows us to understand in detail the other fundamen-
tal feature relevant to our thesis, the typical distinction between two different kinds of 
emotions, the so-called primary (or basic) and secondary (or complex) emotions (Ekman 
[2003]). Primary emotions are fast reaction mechanisms triggered in the early stages of 
perception; short-lived and highly automated responses prompted by fixed programs 
and realized in anatomically ancient brain structures; universal alarm systems found in 
all human cultures and closely related to responses in other primates. They are com-
monly called fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, and surprise – but all these emotion 
words refer to phenomena less rich that those they refer to in folk-psychological narra-
tives. Obviously, when they occur in the human mind, they are typically enriched with 
the conscious recognition of the activating stimulus and the on-line subjective experi-
ence. Secondary emotions are activated by extended, sophisticated, full-blown cognitive 
evaluations, occurring in response to complex stimuli. They are accompanied by the ac-
tivity in the neocortex and require the ability to represent the scenario and analyze the 
relevant information; the ability to assess the (present or future) satisfaction/frustration 
of important and active goals, concerns, needs, desires; the ability to choose among dif-
ferent courses of action. Rather than fixed and fast reactions, they are extended and 
evolving episodes, with ongoing feedbacks that continuously monitor the degree of 
compatibility between the situation and the subject’s goals (Frijda [2010]). 
Because primary emotions as failsafe devices are domain specific programs, they 
have arisen in response to certain critical features of the ancestral environment and are 
necessarily tailored to these particular evolutionary recurrent conditions of activation 
(Cosmides, Tooby [2000]). On the contrary, although secondary emotions are con-
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strained, at least partially, by phylogenesis, ontogenesis, and sociogenesis, they are flex-
ible and open to change. Because they are organized by social rules, instead of genetic 
programming, emotional episodes allow a great deal of improvisation and innovation. 
During the on-line construction of the episodes, creative individuals (in terms of their 
emotional intelligence) can introduce new emotion concepts that diverge from the 
standard prototypes, with corresponding changes occurring in the emotional feelings 
and action schemata. If these innovations prove adaptive and effective for the individu-
al, they may then be emulated by others and come into common use. In this perspec-
tive, secondary emotions are a social construction. Precisely for this reason they show 
great individual and cultural variability (Mesquita, Leu [2007]). 
Grounded cognition theory of emotion explains the distinctions between primary and 
secondary emotions on the basis of the different role performed by consciousness. In 
this regard it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of consciousness: the first-order 
raw experience and the second-order reflexive awareness (Lambie, Marcel [2002]). The 
first represents what it is like to feel a particular emotion; it has an holistic nature; it re-
gards the non conceptual nexus among perception, action, affect; it is often prompted 
by simple antecedents, even when the stimulus occurs outside the focus of attention. 
The second one is a kind of knowing (by acquaintance) the ongoing first-order experi-
ence; it is activated by conscious attention; it selects the relevant features of the first-
order processing and provides an analytic scrutiny of them; it allows reflection, verbal 
reports, deliberate control. From the perspective of grounded cognition, the crucial 
point is as follows: because to be in an emotion state is almost always to be in a phe-
nomenal state, the subjective experience of an emotion, even of a secondary emotion, 
involves only the activation of the specific pattern of beliefs, goals, and somatic feed-
back that distinguishes the emotion. Instead, the understanding of an emotion as a ge-
stalt-like whole requires in addition conscious second-order thoughts that explicitly cat-
egorize the emotion as such, its causes and consequences. It is the content of these acts 
of categorization that make one feeling of fear distinct not only from another emotion, 
but also from other feelings of fear (Feldman Barrett et al. [2007]). 
3. Early art 
With regard to the available archaeological data concerning the early art, the reference 
point is represented by the evidence concerning the Upper Paleolithic (lasting from 
about 40,000 to 10,000 years ago), in particular the findings of Cro-Magnon art in Eu-
rope. These findings are constituted by a complex, integrated set of behaviors and prod-
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ucts commonly thought to be undoubtedly artistic: cave paintings, tridimensional sculp-
tures, musical instruments, architectural disposition of building components, and rich 
ornamentation (Fagan [2010]; Finlayson [2009]). There was probably also storytelling: 
there is a general agreement that language must have been in place (Bannan [2012]). 
Moreover, it is important to pay attention to recent research, particularly at African 
sites, where stones and bones with systematically engraved lines, perforated shells and 
animal teeth, and ochre crayons from 135,000 to 70,000 years ago can be found 
(D’Errico et al. [2003]). So, the general flourishing of artistic behaviors and products dur-
ing the Upper Paleolithic was probably preceded by a slow and gradual process of prep-
aration in which the precursors and preconditions of aesthetic experience developed.  
There are two different lines of interpretation concerning these archaeological date. 
One line affirms that 40,000-30,000 years ago marked a sudden creative explosion (Tat-
tersal [2012]), whilst the other line denies the idea of a cultural revolution and pushes 
back the date of psychological modernity and the behaviors that demonstrate it (String-
er [2012]). However, what matters in our present perspective is that both the lines of in-
terpretation do not modeled the first artistic behaviors and products on the modern 
Western notion of fine art. They do not represent specialized practices with profession-
alized roles; they are not tied to the self-expression of an isolated individual; they are 
not appreciated in dedicated places, such as in a museum, by static individuals; and they 
are not comprised of autonomous objects (i.e. pictures, sculptures, and so on) or activi-
ties (i.e. storytelling, dances, and so on) collected in a superordinate category. The eth-
nologists’ reports from pre-modern societies suggest that all modern hunter-gatherers 
have multi-media group scale ceremonies. In analogy, it is commonly hypothesized that 
the earliest artistic behaviors and products were collective practices in which everyone 
participated and that were organized as multimodal and temporal coordinated experi-
ences (i.e. religious ceremonies replete with dance, music, song, narrative, and gestural 
symbolisms). 
Although this hypothesis is very plausible and generally accepted, we have to 
acknowledge that hitherto the universal agreement on this point was not based on di-
rect evidence: whilst pre-modern societies often depict these common rituals, there is 
not a single cave painting of such ceremonies. Moreover, the subterranean art of the 
Upper Paleolithic is commonly judged to be one of the greatest archaeological enigmas. 
Still, today, anthropologists and archaeologists are no closer to knowing why the artists 
of the Upper Paleolithic penetrated the deep limestone caves in total darkness to depict 
images in inaccessible fissures. However, in spite of this lack of direct evidence and of a 
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comprehensive explanation of the Upper Paleolithic cave paintings, the ethnological and 
anthropological hypothesis of participatory, multimodal, and dynamical art absolutely 
remains the only available option (Dunbar [1996]; Layton [2000]; D.S. Wilson [2003]; 
Mithen [2009]; Churchland [2011]; E.O. Wilson [2012]). This is confirmed by the fact that 
none argue the opposite thesis (that art was not participatory), not even the advocates 
of the display or self-presentation theory of art (Miller [2000]; Menninghaus [2003]). 
Above all, the opposite thesis seems to be an ideological projection from the eight-
eenth-century system of fine arts. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that, although the different evolutionary theories 
have reached no general consensus on the adaptive function of the aesthetic experi-
ence, they clarify definitively that early artistic behaviors and products were not the 
source of actual, empirical, practical, and utilitarian information, simply because these 
kinds of information can be conveyed more effectively by others means (Dissanayake 
[2000]). Even when evolutionary theorists like Pinker have denied the status of adapta-
tion, they have recognized that aesthetic experience allows the exploration in conceptu-
al spaces of possibilities on the basis of imagination (Pinker [1997]). So, in analogy with 
pre-modern tribal art, the early art was, at the same time, decoupled and engaged. It 
was decoupled because it was disconnected from the practical functionality of the im-
mediate problem solving: in this sense, it promoted a “disinterested” and “purposeless” 
use of imagination in all the participants. However, it was engaged because it constitut-
ed a performative, multi-media, collective ritual that each participant experienced as an 
integral part of their life, with crucial and indispensable real-world implications. 
4. The making of the secondary emotions 
In contrast to the paradox of fiction, it is commonly thought that art generally repre-
sents one of the primary ways in which emotions are educated, and that the emotional 
knowledge required for social life is transmitted and improved by examples portrayed in 
images, myths, and narratives (Donald [2006]). Also, it is generally accepted that early 
participatory art may provoke a real emotional contagion, that is more radical than em-
pathy. Contagion and empathy may be both automatic and unconscious, but in the con-
tagion there is a complete identification among the subjects, whilst in the empathy the 
empathizers remain distinct from the targets (de Vignemont, Singer [2006]). Moreover, 
the emotional contagion induced by the first art is more powerful than that of subse-
quent forms of art that make a marked distinction between the audience and the per-
formers. Everyone participates, singing and dancing, mirroring each other’s behavior 
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toward the same affective state. This strong investment facilitates the sharing of com-
mon feelings and attitudes, and it reinforces social bonding (Carroll [2004]). 
However, in our hypothesis, early art not only organized the emotional life of partici-
pants in order to unify the social group; more radically, it invented modern emotions. 
During rituals, the raw affective experience of participants is made special as an extraor-
dinary object of attention; it is explicitly focused and recognized; it is categorized on the 
basis of shared situated conceptualizations. In this perspective, the first art not only ed-
ucated, but it also contributed to the invention of the emotions, particularly the inven-
tions of the secondary emotions, in which pre-reflexive and immediate experience is re-
represented, described, and interpreted. Moreover, the situated conceptualizations are 
not induced via mimesis by a separated author. On the contrary, they are constructed 
collectively and on-line, without previous prototypes. Therefore, the first art stimulated 
the transition from primary emotions, as fixed reaction mechanisms, to the possibility of 
creatively modifying the emotional processes according to the contextual affordances. 
It is important to emphasize that early art helped this transition precisely in virtue of 
the main features we have noted: its multi-media, participatory, and dynamical nature. 
Early art harmonized narratives, paintings, music, dancing, and singing. From our per-
spective, this multimodal experience tied together the linguistic dimension with the per-
ceptual, affective, and somatic aspects in a new global compound. This compound was 
essentially grounded in two intertwined kinds of integration: first, the unity of linguistic 
narratives with visual paintings; second, the unity of symbolic understanding with emo-
tional control. From the first point of view, our ancestors constructed their emotional 
knowledge through the collective stories and myths they learned together during com-
munal rituals. These stories were visually illustrated, and so reinforced and enriched, by 
the correspondence to the iconography of rock art and the symbolic gestures of rituals. 
From the second point of view, our ancestors emproved their emotional competence 
through the control they exercised on the emotional contagion provoked by dancing to-
gether in a repetitive fashion to repetitive music. The first and the second operations 
were intimately connected: the construction of the emotional knowledge through the 
mediation of the narratives, the iconography and the symbolism were, at the same time, 
the control of the personal emotional experiences according to the rules and the oppor-
tunities afforded by the communal stories, pictures, and gestures. 
Obviously, it was crucial to the whole dynamic that the ritual was collective: from prima-
ry emotions as individual reaction systems, the emotional life was embedded in larger 
communal meaning-giving structures enabling a sense of personal continuity. Moreover, 
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it was crucial that the ritual had a multi-structured temporal organization. As is suggest-
ed by pre-modern art, the first stages, involving music, dancing and singing, provoke an 
automatic and complete identification of all the participants in an ecstatic and intense 
experience, whilst the later stages, the time of deliberate image-making, allow a reflex-
ive detachment (Lewis-Williams [2002]). 
Neuroscientific evidence fully corroborates our thesis: understanding oneself (in the 
sense of self-reflecting on current experiences, enduring psychological traits, and auto-
biographical memories in order to develop a personal self-concept) and self-regulation 
(in the sense of intentional control concerning automatic reactions, bottom-up generat-
ed emotions, and reflexive efforts of stimuli reappraisal) represent practices that recruit 
the same medial frontoparietal network of neural circuits (Ochsner, Gross [2005]). Thus, 
in our hypothesis, early art constituted a cultural device intentionally designed by our 
ancestors to stimulate these brain regions in order to integrate sub-symbolic (somatic, 
perceptual, and affective) with symbolic (linguistic, propositional, and conceptual) di-
mensions, bottom-up and stimulus-driven activation with top-down and self-generated 
regulation, automatic and tacit with controlled and deliberate processes in a new order 
of emotional consciousness, emerging from a gestalt-like synthesis of these several 
building blocks. 
So, our conclusion completely denies and removes the perspective based on the par-
adox of fiction. First art contributed to the transition from primary to secondary emo-
tions; from immediate and pre-reflexive experience to constructive and self-conscious 
emotions; from fast and basic reactions to multimodal and integrated emotional epi-
sodes; from individual and fixed alarm systems to shared and creative situated concep-
tualizations of emotions. In summary: especially in their complex version, ordinary emo-
tions do not exist from the beginning. At least to a significant degree, their evolution is 
grounded in the aesthetic emotions induced by the early art and experienced by our an-
cestors on the basis of a decoupled but not disengaged use of aesthetic imagination. 
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